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Recent  experimental  literature  in  labor  economics  shows  that  fairness  concerns  make  a 
substantial  difference  for  working  decisions.  Our  study  systematically  explores  how  the 
existence  of  multiple  fairness  foci  influences  wage  setting  and  acceptance  thresholds. 
Particularly, we focus on the effect of horizontal fairness concerns, i.e., the wage comparison 
among employees. For our experiment, we use an institutional design of wage negotiations 
among employers, employees and temporary agency workers. Working agencies hire these 
workers and rent them out to firms. Thereby, we create a heterogeneous background of the 
labour force. Although temporary agency workers do the same work, typically, they receive 
lower  wages  due  to  the  intermediate  agency.  The  results  of  our  laboratory  experiments 
indicate that the availability of information concerning co-employee’s wage offers strongly 
influences the wage set and participants’ acceptance of contracts. Whereas the relation of 
average wages is not influenced by the order of the decisions, the absolute level of wages is 
dependent on the decisions. We find that temporary agency workers who decide on a wage 
offer  after  permanent  employees  receive  a  premium  in  addition  to  their  wages,  while 
permanent employees take a cut in wages if they get their wage offer after temporary workers 
have  decided  on  their  offers.  These  results  are  more  influenced  by  self-regarding  social 
comparison preferences than by other-regarding horizontal fairness concerns. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Fairness norms are highly relevant for work-related decisions in organizations and on the 
labour market. Although there has been much in-depth research on fairness issues,
1 many 
aspects of fairness behaviour are still not very well understood.
2 This is especially true for the 
relevance of fairness judgements in complex, rich settings where multiple reference points 
could guide behaviour. In the following, as one example of the wider class of situations with 
multiple fairness foci, we experimentally analyse the relation between two reference points 
for social preferences, vertical fairness considerations and horizontal fairness considerations 
in a complex ultimatum game setting with three interrelated ultimatum games. Hereby, we use 
the term “vertical fairness considerations” for the relation between the outcome distributions 
among proposers and responders in ultimatum games and responders’ acceptance thresholds. 
By  contrast,  we  use  the  term  “horizontal  fairness  concerns”  to  characterize  the  relation 
between the outcome distributions among several responders and their acceptance thresholds.  
As one example, we consider the co-employment of regular employees and temporary agency 
workers. This situation is especially interesting since there are vertical foci, e.g., the payoffs 
of  the  respective  contract  partners  (employee  and  employer,  temporary  work  agency  and 
temporary worker) and horizontal foci for fairness judgements, e.g., the absolute or relative 
wage of the other worker, with or without reference to other differences between the two 
types of workers. Moreover, this environment allows for different interpretations of fairness 
considerations. We model a situation where employees have to do the same work. Therefore, 
one may argue that only equal wages would treat temporary and regular employees fairly. On 
the  other  hand,  in  this  institutional  setting,  there  are  obvious  reasons  that  the  wages  of 
temporary  and  regular  employees  differ,  since  there  is  an  intermediating  agency  between 
employers and temporary employees. Employers have to pay the agency as well, so that one 
can  argue  that  wages  for  temps  have  to  deviate  from  wages  of  regular  employees.  Our 
treatments systematically vary the sequential order of decisions, and, thereby, the available 
information about some of these possible fairness foci. We can, thus, derive information about 
the relevance of these elements in the formation of fairness judgements.  
 
                                                 
1 To name only a few more recent papers, for example, Bolten & Ockenfels, 2000, Dickinson & Tiefenthaler, 
2002, Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, Gächter & Fehr, 2002, Kahnemann et al., 1986, Konow, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2003, 
Rabin 1993, and Scott, 2003. 
2  For  an  early  paper  from  the  perspective  of  psychology,  see  Leventhal  (1980);  he  identifies  the 
multidimensionality of fairness concepts as one of the three major problems with equity theory.   3 
The co-employment of hired and rented hands is only one example from a wider class 
of situations with multiple fairness foci. Particularly, we choose it as our example since it is 
currently  of  considerable  political  relevance  in  the  European  Union.  Several  institutional 
changes have been recently introduced that aim at decreasing unemployment by furthering 
temporary agency work. As an example, in order to increase the acceptance of temporary 
employment,  Germany  introduced  the  compulsory  equal  treatment  of  permanent  and 
temporary employees if no collective agreement applies (Alewell et al., 2004). 
 
The fairness and justice literature identifies different fairness norms, reference points 
or justice principles that can potentially guide the judgement on whether allocations are fair; 
for  example,  equality  and  needs,  equity  and  desert,  efficiency  or  accountability  (Konow, 
2003), absolute differences in pay-off versus relative pay-off (Bolten & Ockenfels, 2000, Fehr 
& Schmidt, 1999), changes  in one’s own pay-off  versus pay-off relative to others (Scott, 
2003), effects of  entitlements (Kahnemann et al., 1986), total  surplus or net surplus over 
reservation utility, horizontal fairness between different workers or vertical fairness between 
the employer and worker (Knez & Camerer, 1995). Despite the multiple insights on the effect 
of the context on fairness evaluations (for an in-depth overview, see Konow, 2003), specific 
hypotheses about the relevance of differing fairness norms are still to some extent speculative, 
since there are many situational factors that influence fairness evaluations – for example, the 
scope  of  the  comparisons,  the  weighting  of  justice  principles,  competing  forces  such  as 
fairness and self-interest and the relative importance of procedural and distributive justice 
(Konow,  2003).
3  Therefore,  at  this  point  in  the  research,  much  can  still  be  learnt  from 
experimental  studies  with  multiple  fairness  foci  that  systematically  vary  aspects  of  the 
situation.  
 
Apparently, within organizations and on labour markets, multiple foci of fairness are 
relevant  in  many  contexts,  e.g.,  regarding  wage  decisions  concerning  employees  with 
differing sets of human capital investment and heterogeneous needs doing the same work, lay-
off  decisions  concerning  workers  with  differing  seniority,  family  responsibilities,  outside 
options  and  performance,  training  investment  decisions  for  employees  with  differing 
performance, outside options and future employment perspectives. For our analysis, we chose 
the issue of the co-employment of regular employees and temporary agency workers under   4 
heterogeneous contracts, since this allows us to investigate not only two employees, but also 
two  employers  with  differing  characteristics.  Thus,  horizontal  as  well  as  vertical  social 
comparisons or foci for fairness judgements are available. The game theoretic solution does 
not hold for the standard results of standard ultimatum games with two players and outside 
options of zero. Rather some kind of fairness consideration will be relevant (see, for example 
Güth et al., 1982, Güth & Tietz, 1990, Güth et al., 1998, Camerer, 2003). Generally, in simple 
two-player ultimatum games with outside options of zero, responders accept splits of between 
twenty and fifty percent, while lower offers are frequently rejected (Camerer, 2003).  
 
In ultimatum games with more than two persons, multiple foci for fairness judgements 
may result, as horizontal or vertical comparisons could be relevant. Positive, but different, 
outside options of responders further add possible foci. Knez and Camerer (1995) conduct a 
three-player  ultimatum  game  with  one  proposer  offering  to  two  responders.  These  have 
positive, but differing, outside options. Observations are based on the strategy method. Both 
ultimatum games are independent from each other because neither responder’s decision has 
any direct impact on the other ultimatum game. However, the design offers opportunities for 
social  comparison  not  only  vertically,  between  proposer  and  responder  as  in  standard 
ultimatum  games,  but  also  horizontally,  between  the  two  responders,  as  well.  The 
experimental  data  indicate  that  approximately  half  the  responders  obviously  conducted  a 
social comparison  between responders, while the other  half of the responders, as  well as 
proposers, did  not. Consequently, this setting  led  to rejection rates of approximately  fifty 
percent of all the offers, much higher rates than in other studies. The authors argue that the 
introduction of multiple possible foci for fairness judgements resulted in a self-serving bias 
(Babcock  et  al.,  1996)  or  egocentric  selections  between  these  different  foci  of  fairness 
judgements  for  each  player:
4  While  proposers  select  a  fairness  standard  which  leads  to 
relatively low offers, responders focus on reference points which lead to high offers, and 
therefore  reject  the  lower  offers  more  frequently  than  in  the  simple  ultimatum  game. 
Moreover, even for those individuals who apply social comparisons between responders, the 
strength of this motive seems to hinge, in a critical and complex way, on the size of the 
payoffs received by the proposer and the other responder. Thus, the relevance of horizontal 
fairness  judgements  –  as  opposed  to  vertical  fairness  standards,  which  are  very  well 
                                                                                                                                                   
3 Besides situational factors, different cultural reference points for fairness (for an overview, see Camerer, 2003, 
chapter  2)  and  gender  differences  in  fairness  behavior  (e.g.  Dickinson  &  Tiefenthaler,  2002)  are  found  in 
experiments. 
4 Konow (2000) elaborates on these issues with respect to the ‘accountability’ principle of fairness.   5 
documented in the experimental literature – is quite ambiguous even for simple situations 
where the single ultimatum games are not directly interrelated.
5 Extending this insight, we 
concentrate  on  the  analysis  of  multiple  foci  for  fairness  judgements  and  construct  three 
interrelated ultimatum games with four players, where the result of the first ultimatum game 
influences the third game. 
 
Yet many different contextual elements might be relevant for the selection of fairness 
foci.  The  available  information  will  influence  the  fairness  judgement,  as  non-available 
information  might  be  neglected  in  the  decision  or  be  substituted  by  ceteris  paribus 
assumptions  (see  Konow,  2003).  Of  course,  the  importance  of  the  sequential  order  of 
decisions  and  the  availability  of  precise  information  for  decisions  has  been  analysed 
extensively. The theoretical analysis (e.g., Bagwell, 1995, Huck & Müller, 2000, Schelling, 
1960) predicts a strategic advantage for those parties who first decide about their share of a 
common  pie,  such  that  the  first  movers  receive  the  entire  surplus  from  the  bargaining. 
However,  since  the  work  of  Güth  et  al.  (1982),  it  has  been  obvious  in  the  experimental 
literature about ultimatum bargaining that there is no clear-cut first mover advantage because 
of the effect of vertical fairness concerns. Studies dealing with horizontal concerns attempt to 
differentiate among second movers, i.e., responders in sequential but independent ultimatum 
games. Again, theory predicts that there is neither a first responder advantage nor a second 
responder advantage. Yet, as shown  by  Charness  &  Kuhn (2004), the observation of co-
workers wages is quite important for workers' effort decisions. The main result is that firms 
react  to  the  fact  that  wages  become  public  by  suppressing  wage  dispersion,  obviously 
anticipating negative reactions by workers to large wage differences. Thus, wage secrecy and 
wage compression policies have relevant implications for firms’ performance. Consequently, 
there is a second responder advantage; specifically, responders who observe other responders’ 
decisions receive a premium in order to avoid negative wage discrimination, which violates 
their – horizontal – fairness needs.  
 
With these results in mind – selected out of the large number of possible elements on 
which further research is needed – our paper focuses on the effect of the sequential order of 
decisions and the resulting availability of  information that can  be used to form reference 
points. We extend the setting of Charness & Kuhn (2004) by introducing an intermediating 
                                                 
5 Knez and Camerer (1995, p. 67, fn 2) conclude that to understand how fairness issues affect organizations, 
“richer games that are more like complicated organizations” would be required, with three player ultimatum   6 
agency  for  –  temporary  –  employees.  Thus,  the  fairness  considerations  for  the  relation 
between employer, agency and temporary employee are more complex. We avoid the salience 
of equivalent wage offers among employees. Rather, we will test whether there is some kind 
of substitution effect between horizontal and vertical fairness considerations. Particularly, we 
analyse the direction of horizontal fairness considerations. One may argue that players have 
other-regarding needs. If so, a ratio of offers substantially discriminating against any of the 
responders will be rejected, not only offers discriminating against themselves. On the other 
hand, one can think of horizontal fairness considerations as social comparison needs so that 
offers  that  would  have  been  below  the  acceptance  threshold  when  no  information  was 
available become acceptable due to a favourable horizontal comparison. Our results clearly 
indicate that, indeed, the public information on wages functions as a social comparison norm. 
Yet, there  is  a  two-sided  effect.  There  are  both  second  responder  advantages,  as  well  as 
second responder disadvantages, due to horizontal fairness concerns. Those responders who 
observe  decisions  of  other  responders  with  higher  outside  options  receive  a  premium. 
Apparently, proposers anticipate the horizontal fairness concerns of the observing responder 
and  increase  their  offers.  However,  those  responders  who  observe  decisions  of  other 
responders  with  lower  outside  options  receive  lower  wage  offers,  which  are  nevertheless 
acceptable due to their horizontal comparison. Thus, proposers benefit from the responders’ 
expected needs for social comparison in this setting. 
 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  2  introduces  the  model  of  the 
interdependent ultimatum game and develops the theoretical predictions. Section 3 reports the 
experimental design. Section 4 elaborates on hypotheses for players' behaviour and discusses 
counterarguments. Section 5 shows the results of the laboratory experiments, while Section 6 
concludes the paper with a discussion. 
 
2. The model 
 
There are four players in our model: an employer or principal P, a temporary work agency A, 
an employee a (hired hand) and a temporary agency worker r (rented hand). For both workers, 
a and r, we assume that effort and effort costs are exogenously given, and can therefore be 
excluded from our analysis. Wage payments are thus the only relevant decision parameters for 
the two employees. Both workers i = {r, a} have positive, but differing, reservation utilities 
                                                                                                                                                   
games being only one step in the right direction.   7 
Ui from unemployment benefits. Employee a has a larger reservation utility than temporary 
worker r, Ua > Ur. If employed, they both do the same work. Therefore, each worker has the 
same  level  of  productivity,  denoted  as  D.  We  assume  that  all  reservation  utilities  and 
productivity are common knowledge.   
 
Agency A can employ temporary worker r and offer r wr. If r accepts this offer, he is 
under contract with A and earns wr; if not, he earns unemployment benefit Ur. Employer P has 
to decide on the wage offer wa made to employee a. If a accepts, employee a works for P and 
earns wa; if he does not agree, he remains unemployed and earns unemployment benefit Ua. 
Additionally, P can contract with temporary work agency A to temporarily hire worker r. For 
this, he offers the agency a hiring fee wA. If A accepts (conditional on r’s acceptance of the 
contract with agency A), then worker r is hired out to P. Otherwise, A hires out r for an 
outside option, yielding UA for the agency. Defining 
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for i = {a, r, A}, we can compute the profit of P as 
(2)      . ) ( r A A a a a r A P w w d d d d d d p - - D + =  
The profit of agency A is given by 
(3)      ) ) 1 ( ( r A a A A r A w U w - - + = d d d p , 
while rented hand r earns 
(4)      r r r r r U w ) 1 ( d d p - + = , 
and hired hand a receives 
(5)      a a a a a U w ) 1 ( d d p - + = . 
Assuming  e 2 2 + + > D a A U U , with e denoting the smallest feasible increment, 
and further assuming UA > Ur + e, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game 
is characterized by 
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Note that the optimal wage offers are independent of the wage offers to other players, but 
depend solely on the reservation utilities. 
   8 
As can easily be seen by this model description, the model contains three interrelated 
ultimatum games. While the two ultimatum games between the two employers P and A and 
their respective employees a and r are independent from each other, but could be interrelated 
indirectly by a horizontal social comparison if participants received information about the 
wage offers to the other players, the result of the ultimatum game between the two employers 
P and A has a direct effect on the game between A and r, as the renting out fee wA, if accepted, 
defines the size of the pie that can be divided between A and r. 
 
3. Experimental designs and treatments 
 
The  experiment  was  conducted  at  the  EconLab  at  the  University  of  Bonn,  Germany  in 
October, November and December 2005.
6 Participants were students from Bonn University. 
As  the  experiment  aims  at  testing  for  the  influence  of  the  differing  fairness  foci  of  the 
participants, we designed two treatments which vary the information that is available for the 
two  employees  by  changing  the  sequential  order  of  the  decisions.  In  both  treatments  the 
ultimatum game between P and A is conducted first. Additionally, A chooses the wage offer 
wr, and all participants are informed about offer wA and A's decision dA. The order of the other 
two ultimatum games, however, differs in the two treatments: 
 
i.  In the treatment “staff”, employer P offers wa first, and employee a makes his decision 
da. Employee r is informed about wr, wa and da , and makes his decision. 
ii.  In treatment “temp”, the game between agency  A and worker r is conducted first. 
Employee a is informed about wa, wr and dr , and makes his decision. 
 
The information sets can described as follows, with superscripts R and S denoting the 
treatments “staff” and “temp”:
7 
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6 Experiments were computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 1999). For the recruitment of subjects, we used 
Orsee (Greiner, 2004). 
7 Participants knew about reservation utilities and productivity, which we have not explicitly mentioned here.   9 
Thus  in  the  treatment  “staff”,  players  r  had  information  about  an  additional  horizontal 
fairness focus, while in the treatment “temp”, this additional information was available for 
players a.
8 Productivity D of an individual worker was set as 19 experimental currency units, 
while the reservation pay-offs were defined by Ua = 3, Ur = 1, and UA = 10 experimental 
currency units. 
 
Before starting the experiment, participants had sufficient time to study the instructions 
and  ask  questions  privately.  In  the  instructions  we  referred  explicitly  to  wage  negotiations 
between  firms,  agencies,  employees  and  temporary  employees,  which  made  it  easy  for 
participants to understand the entire structure of the experiment. We then applied a questionnaire, 
which  tested  participants’  understanding  of  the  game  and  of  the  pay-off  structure.
9  Only 
participants with a sufficient understanding and good test results were allowed to participate in 
the experiment. In total, 168 subjects participated in the 14 sessions, 7 for the “staff” treatment, 
and 7 for the “temp” treatment. Within each session, there were 3 subjects for each role. Each 
participant played 15 periods of the interdependent ultimatum game. We used a stranger design 
and  constant  roles,  such  that  participants  remained  in  the  same  role  throughout  the  entire 
experiment,  but  were  anonymously  grouped  together  anew  by  chance  in  every  round.  The 
average length of the experiment was 60 minutes. In addition to a fixed show-up fee of € 4, 
players  earned  variable  pay-offs  according  to  their  decisions  in  the  game.  All  experimental 
currency units were converted at a rate of 24 units for € 1.00 at the end of the experiment. 
Average pay-offs were € 7.26 (standard deviation, hereafter abbreviated sd, 1.36) for the P role, 




Starting with the results of standard ultimatum games, our first hypothesis targets vertical 
fairness issues between agency A and temporary worker r, on the one hand, and between 
employer P and employee a, on the other hand. 
H1 (Standard vertical fairness concerns between employers and employees): 
Against the  background of the cooperative Nash  solution, the size of the pie that can  be 
divided between the players of the ultimatum games has to be calculated as a surplus over the 
reservation pay-offs. Standard results of ultimatum games with zero reservation utilities show 
                                                 
8 The instructions for treatment “staff” can be found in appendix A. 
9 See appendix B.   10 
that offers of between 20 and 50 percent of the total size of the pie are frequently made and 
accepted (e.g., Camerer, 2003). Combing both results, for the standard ultimatum games, i.e., 
between P and a, and between A and r, we expect proposers’ offers to share the respective 
size of the surplus over reservation utilities approximately equally. For the upper limit, we 
expect 0.5, while for the lower limit we expect 40 percent of the upper limit, i.e., 0.2 of the 
surplus, or 
(8)      ( )
( )
. 5 . 0 2 . 0    and    5 . 0 2 . 0 with 2 1
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Offers below the lower threshold will seldom be made and will frequently be rejected; offers 
larger than the upper threshold will seldom be made. 
 
However, for the interdependent ultimatum game between P and A, the revenue has to 
be divided between three parties in the temporary work agency relationship. Therefore, we 
expect the following effect. 
H2 (Adaptation of vertical fairness concerns to a higher number of responders): 
A and P react to the differing number of persons that share the pie by adapting the fairness 
standards  known  from  two-player  ultimatum  games  to the  three-player  ultimatum  games: 
They divide the surplus production revenue not by half, but such that P retains a share of 
about one-third for himself and A receives approximately two-thirds to share with worker r. 
Therefore, each player earns roughly one-third of the surplus. As a consequence, the upper 
limit is two-thirds, i.e., the ratio that divides the surplus of the first ultimatum game by the 
relation of the number of the players participating in the subordinated ultimatum game and the 
number of the participating players in both games. For the lower limit, we expect – similarly 
to the two-person case – approximately 0.4 of the upper limit, yielding 0.266. Therefore, we 
predict  
(9)      ( ) . 66 . 0 266 . 0 with  £ £ - D + = b b A A A U U w  
Smaller offers will seldom be made, and if made, they will frequently be rejected. 
 
Hypotheses H1 and H2 do not consider effects that are caused by horizontal fairness 
norms.  At the other extreme, one could argue that vertical norms are dominated by horizontal 
fairness norms, i.e., equal payment for equal work. Equal payment for equal work could only 
be offered at the expense of the temporary work agency or at the expense of the regular 
employee. Thus, one could predict that vertical fairness norms will be neglected using the 
following hypothesis.   11 
H3 (Dominance of horizontal fairness norms): 
The wage offers to employee a and temporary worker r do not differ since they do the same 
work. Consequently,  






However, given the strong experimental results on the relevance of vertical fairness 
concerns, it seems less plausible to assume that players exclusively pay attention to horizontal 
fairness norms. Therefore, the main purpose of our study is to show to which extent horizontal 
fairness norms interfere with vertical fairness concerns. In the treatment “staff”, the ultimatum 
game between employer P and employee a takes place before the ultimatum game between 
agency A and temporary worker r. Thus, a has to make his decision, while ignoring the direct 
horizontal  wage  comparisons  between  the  two  workers.  In  the  treatment  “temp”,  the 
information about agency A’s offer to hire employee r and r’s acceptance decision is available 
to  a.  Thus,  a  comparison  of  the  behaviour  for  a  between  the  two treatments  reveals  the 
additional effect of a social comparison between a and r. For r, the same effect could be 
relevant: While he decides without any information about P’s offer to a and a’s reaction in the 
treatment “temp”, this information is added in the treatment “staff”: specifically, there exists 
an additional possible focus for horizontal fairness concerns. Therefore, we predict 
H4 (Effects of adding horizontal wage information): 
Adding a reference point for the horizontal fairness concerns of workers changes acceptance 
rates – in comparison to the case in which there is no horizontal information – in two possible 
ways: On the one hand, due to a favourable horizontal comparison, e.g., wr/wa ³ 1 for r in the 
“staff” treatment, one could argue that social comparison (or self-regarding horizontal fairness 
concerns) makes offers acceptable that would have been below the acceptance threshold were 
no information available. Similarly, due to an inauspicious horizontal comparison, e.g., wa/wr 
< 1 for a in the “temp” treatment, offers are not acceptable that would have been above the 
acceptance threshold were no information available. On the other hand, one could argue that 
players may care about a decent ratio on offers that do not discriminate against either of the two 
players.  We  refer  to  this  idea  as  the  other-regarding  needs.  Hence,  a  ratio  wr/wa  (wa/wr, 
respectively) which differs substantially from one leads to rejections, although the underlying 
offer would be acceptable if observed without consideration of the social comparison.  
   12 
Finally, in their social-comparison, three-person ultimatum game, Knez and Camerer 
(1995) observe high rejection rates under multiple fairness foci and interpret this as a result of 
egocentric  selection  processes.  While  proposers  select  fairness  standards  which  lead  to 
relatively low offers, responders focus on reference points which lead to high offers, and 
therefore reject the lower offers more frequently than in the simple ultimatum game. We have 
to stress that in this experiment offers were made simultaneously. In contrast, we argue that P 
and A players  in our setting consider the  influence of the  horizontal  fairness concerns of 
players a and r since offers are made sequentially.   
H5 (Anticipation of fairness foci): 
P  and  A  players  in  the  experiment  anticipate  the  effects  of  the  social  comparisons  of 
employees  in  the  “temp”  treatment  and  of  temporary  employees  in  the  “staff”  treatment. 
Players r, who decide about the wage in the “staff” treatment, receive a premium in addition 




We  first  look  at  the  average  offers  for  both  treatments,  which  are  shown  in  Table  1. 
Obviously, offers do not follow the game-theoretic prediction. Additionally, average offers to 
a are larger than wage offers to r. We find that both accepted and overall offers wA, wa and wr 
are significantly higher in the “staff” treatment than in the “temp” treatment.
10 Since P earns 
the residuals of the ultimatum games, the average pay-off  for P  is smaller  in the  “staff” 
treatment than in the “temp” treatment. 
 
 
Table 1: Average and average accepted offers 
 
  The analysis for H1 tries to find the relation between our experimental observation and 
the standard results of ultimatum games. Hereby, we focus on vertical fairness aspects. For 
this purpose, we have to determine the number of observations that fall within the parameters 
Averages  staff  temporary 
  wA                (sd)    13.21       (2.25)    12.02       (3.16) 
       wA|dA = 1   (sd)            13.58       (1.94)            12.95       (2.74)          
  wa                (sd)      8.94       (2.70)      8.38       (2.84) 
       wa|da = 1    (sd)              9.44       (2.59)              8.70       (2.91) 
  wr                (sd)      6.09       (1.94)      5.44      (2.01) 
       wr|dr = 1    (sd)              6.52       (1.84)              5.79       (2.03)    13 
of the acceptance threshold a. Indeed, for employees, we find approximately 86 percent in the 
“staff” treatment and 83 percent in the “temp” treatment, respectively, of all wa that fall only 
within this interval. Moreover, considering the rejection rates for offers, as shown in Figure 
1(a), we have to confirm H1 for employees in the “staff” treatment since we find a dramatic 
increase in the frequency of rejection for a < 0.2. Thus, for the “staff” treatment, it seems that 
there is an acceptance threshold of approximately a = 0.2, which corresponds to offers of 7. 
However, the rejection rate in the “temp” treatment looks rather different. Here, even for 
offers smaller than 7, there is no dramatic increase in the frequency of rejection.  
 
For  temporary  employees,  we  have  to  differentiate  between  the  cases  in  which 
agencies reject the offer of P and the cases in which agencies accept their offers.
11 Again, we 
find the majority of stated offers are within the limits suggested if agencies reject (94 percent 
for the “staff” and 91 percent for the “temp” cases). When the agencies accept wA, however, 
in the “staff” treatment (the “temp” treatment), they choose wr in 73 percent (70 percent) of 
the cases from the interval defined in equation (8). 
 
Figure 1: Rejection rates of (a) employees and (b) temporary employees 
 
As shown in Figure 1(b), the rejection rates again suggest a rejection threshold of 
approximately  a  =  0.2,
12  although  the  structure  is  not  as  clear  as  for  employees.  Quite 
surprisingly, in the “temp” treatment, the rejection by temporary workers follows the same 
                                                                                                                                                   
10 For all differences, we find p < 0.01, using two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test for offers and using two-sided 
Mann-Whitney test for accepted offers. 
11 In the former case, the limits are 6 > wr > 3, while in the latter case, we have 0.5 + 0.5 wA > wr > 0.8 + 0.2 wA. 
12 Here, the data of cases that agencies reject and that agencies accept is pooled.     14 
unusual structure as for employees. Our interpretation is that the more complicated ultimatum 
game  between  agencies  and  temporary  employees  makes  it  more  difficult  to  see  a  clear 
structure  regarding  what  is  considered  to  be  acceptable  and  what  is  not.
13  Then  social 
comparison transfers this ambiguity to employees. The opposite effect applies for the “staff” 
treatment. Here, the clear-cut structure of rejection thresholds for employees is transferred 
over to temporary employees. Overall, the data do not reject H1 for employees and temporary 
employees in the “staff” treatment. Yet, rejection behaviour in the “temp” treatment differs 
substantially. 
 
  With respect to H2, we find a different pattern. Only 57 percent of all observations for 
wA in the “staff” treatment, and even less, only 29 percent in the “temp” treatment, are within 
the predicted range. This result may indicate that behaviour in the independent ultimatum 
game does differ quite substantially from observed behaviour in standard ultimatum games. 
Note that the median b for the “temp” treatment is 0.222, while it is 0.333 for the “staff” 
treatment. Therefore, offers are much lower than observed in standard games. With respect to 
the rejection rate of agencies for wA as shown in Figure 2, we do not observe a clear-cut 
acceptance threshold. There is no threshold to be observed since there is no step-wise increase 
in the rejection rate as offers decrease. There is  little difference between rejections in the 
“staff”  treatment  and  rejections  in  the  “temp”  treatment.  Thus,  there  is  no  difference  for 
agencies across the two treatments. In general, we find little experimental evidence supporting 
H2, i.e., that offers in the ultimatum game between P and A are only adapted to the higher 
number of responders. Behaviour differs quite substantially from what could be predicted on 
the basis of standard ultimatum games. 
                                                 
13 When agencies accept their offers, one may argue that temporary employees reject offers since they consider 
the fraction that agencies earn from the entire production, i.e., (wA-wr)/19, as being unfair. However, since the 
correlation between the acceptance on the part of temporary employees and this ratio for the cases in which 
agencies accept their offers does not differ significantly from zero for both treatments (-0.17 for the “staff” 
treatment, and -0.12 for the “temp” treatment; two-sided Pearson correlation tests cannot reject the hypothesis 
that correlations equal zero on an a= 0.05 level), we will not focus on this issue in the following analysis.     15 
 
Figure 2: Rejection rates of agencies 
 
For the analysis of H3, we have to consider the effects of horizontal fairness concerns. 
One  theoretical  possibility  is  that  horizontal  fairness  norms  between  workers  could 
completely offset vertical fairness issues. As mentioned earlier, we do not expect to find this 
dominance. The average development of wr/wa throughout the entire experiment is shown in 
Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: The average relation wr/wa  across periods (a) of all offers and (b) of offers that were accepted by a and 
r only. 
 
Neither the ratio based on all offers (shown in Figure 3(a)) nor the ratio based on 
accepted offers only (shown in Figure 3(b)) supports H3. However, we find a stable ratio 
wr/wa in both treatments. Even if we only consider offers that were accepted by employee a   16 
and temporary worker r, there is no significant difference between the ratios in the “staff” 
treatment and in the “temp” treatment.
14 Of course, in general, wr will be smaller than wa, as 
the surplus that can be divided between agency  A and worker r is much smaller than the 
surplus that can be divided between employer P and employee a. Thus, the ratio does not 
support the claim of equal payment for equal work; but we find that – considering the results 
for accepted offers only – a wage ratio between 0.7 and 0.8 is acceptable. 
 
So far, we have seen that there is a quite stable ratio between wage offers for a and r. 
Therefore, it seems important to clarify the extent to which horizontal fairness concerns can 
“substitute” for vertical fairness concerns. H4 aims at this question and states that adding a 
reference point  for horizontal  fairness concerns  results  in wage offers that are acceptable 
(inacceptable) in the no-horizontal-information treatment, but inacceptable (acceptable) in the 
information treatment. In order to test the experimental data for this question, we run a series 
of logit estimations for the rejection decisions da and dr. Of course, we have to consider that 
there are  important interpersonal differences. Therefore, we estimate two individual  fixed 
effects models with dependent variables da, and dr, respectively. Let us define the dummy 
variable as s = 0 if observations are from the “staff” treatment and as s = 1 if observations are 
from the “temp” treatment. As independent variables indicating vertical fairness concerns, we 
use the ratio ai for i = 1,2, as defined in equation (8). We can predict a positive coefficient for 
ai in both models, i.e., the positive influence of ai on both variables da, and dr. However, we 
expect vertical fairness considerations to have less influence on da in the “temp” treatment 
than in the “staff” treatment, i.e., ai to have a lower influence on da if s = 1, whereas the 
influence of vertical fairness considerations on dr in the “temp” treatment is stronger than in 
the  “staff”  treatment,  i.e.,  ai  to  have  a  higher  influence  on  dr  if  s  =  1.  Results  for  this 
estimation are reported as models v in Table 2. Additionally, we test the ratio wr/wa, indicating 
horizontal fairness concerns in the information treatments, i.e., in “staff” for variable dr and in 
“temp” for variable da.
15 Yet, the direction of influence of horizontal fairness concerns differs 
considerably across the values of wr/wa and players. One may think of two different lines of 
argumentation. We call one line social comparison needs. Here, horizontal fairness concerns 
improve the acceptability of offers if the ratio favours one’s own payoffs. For this line we can 
                                                 
14 On an a= 0.05 level, a two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test cannot reject the hypothesis that ratios for all 
offers of both treatments are the same; on an a= 0.05 level, a two-sided Mann-Whitney test cannot reject the 
hypothesis that ratios for the accepted offers of both treatments are the same.   17 
predict that the more the ratio favours temporary employees, the larger the positive influence 
of wr/wa on dr. Thus, we can predict a positive coefficient for wr/wa if s = 0. Likewise, we can 
argue that the more the inverse ratio wa/wr favours employees, the larger the influence of wa/wr  
on da. Thus, we expect a positive coefficient for wa/wr if s = 1. The estimation results for 
social  comparison  needs  are  reported  as  models  hsoc  in  Table  2.  Yet,  the  other  line  of 
argumentation  suggests  that  players  care  about  a  decent  ratio  of  offers,  which  does  not 
discriminate against either of the two players. We call this line the other-regarding needs. 
Thus, the more the ratio wr/wa (the inverse ratio wa/wr, respectively) deviates from one, the 
less  acceptable  the  offers  are.  Hence,  we  define  a  variable  that  measures  the  quadratic 
distance from equal offers, i.e., t1=(wr/wa-1)
2 and t2=(wa/wr-1)
2. This measure is expected to 
show a negative coefficient. Results of the estimations are summarized as models hor in Table 
2;
16 goodness of fit is reported by the Akaïke information criterion (AIC).  
 
  da|s = 0  da|s = 1  dr|s = 1  dr|s = 0 



































 wa /wr     
0.74** 
(0.334) 
         




t1       
0.11 
(0.168) 
       
t2               
-0.06 
(1.396) 
AIC  173  191  188  193  269  274  270  276 
 
 
Table 2: Logit regression results for coefficients  
                                                                                                                                                   
15 We set the ratios equal to zero for all observations where responders who had to decide first rejected the offer, 
i.e., da =0 in the “staff” treatment and dr =0 in the “temp” treatment.  
16 Standard errors in parenthesis;*** significant on a = 0.01 level, ** significant on  a = 0.05 level, * significant 
on a = 0.1 level. 
   18 
As  expected,  contract  acceptance  by  employee  a  is  strongly  and  significantly 
influenced in a positive way by vertical fairness concerns (ai) in both treatments. Confirming 
our predictions, vertical fairness concerns are higher when no information is available, i.e., s 
= 0. On the other hand, horizontal fairness concerns in the sense of social comparison, i.e., wa 
/wr, show a significant positive influence on a’s contract acceptance if player r decides first. 
However, the insignificant variable t1 indicate that horizontal fairness concerns follow the 
idea of social comparison rather than other-regarding needs. Hence, we find a substitution 
effect for some wa offers. For an offer wa, which is acceptable if no horizontal information is 
provided, the probability that a will accept decreases in the information treatment as the ratio 
wa/wr decreases. For the offer acceptance by temporary employee r, vertical fairness concerns 
strongly and significantly influence the probability that a temporary employee will accept a 
contract. The higher ai is, the higher the probability of acceptance. Again, this effect is less 
pronounced in the information treatment, i.e., s = 0. Here, horizontal fairness concerns matter 
quite a lot. The higher the ratio wr /wa , the higher the probability that r will accept the offer. 
For an offer wr which is inacceptable if no horizontal information is provided, the probability 
that r will accept increases in the information treatment as the ratio wr /wa increases. Again, 
social comparison matters, but we do not find other regarding needs to have a significant 
effect. Summarising the results of the estimation models, we can support H4, i.e., that vertical 
and horizontal fairness considerations are substituted for one another. This effect refers to 
some social comparison; that is, an offer is acceptable due to a favourable comparison to 
another player’s offer, although the offer may not be acceptable if no comparative information 
is available.  
 
With  respect  to  H5,  we  claim  that  rejection  rates  do  not  increase  under  multiple 
fairness foci because proposers adapt their offers, anticipating the horizontal fairness concerns 
of  responders.  Therefore,  we  consider  the  development  of  efficiency  and  payoffs  across 
experimental periods. Please note that the efficiency provides a mirror image of rejections. 
Whenever  offers  are  rejected,  efficiency  is  decreased.  Figure  4(a)  shows  average  overall 
efficiency, while we normalized efficiency such that 0 efficiency characterizes the case in 
which  player  a  and  player  r  reject  their  offers.  Figure  4(b)  reports  the  development  of 
efficiency  within  the  ultimatum  game  between  P  and  a.  Finally,  Figure  4(c)  shows  the 
development of efficiency within the ultimatum game between A and r. As one can see, there 
is  no  difference  between  the  treatments  for  efficiency  in  general  and  for  the  separate   19 
ultimatum  games.  A  non-parametric  test  supports  this  hypothesis.
17  Moreover,  we  do  not 
observe a clear time effect. Efficiency remains at approximately 80 percent throughout the 
entire experiment.  
 
 
Figure 4: Average efficiency per period (a) overall, (b) within ultimatum game between P and a, 
 and (c) within the ultimatum game between A and r throughout the experiment 
 
However, we find a treatment effect with respect to the distribution of earnings. Figure 
5(a) compares the earnings of player P and player A across treatments and periods. As one can 
                                                 
17 Two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests cannot reject the hypothesis of equal efficiency on an a = 0.05 level.    20 
see, on average player P receives lower earnings in the “staff” treatment than in the “temp” 
treatment. Indeed, a non-parametric test confirms this result.
18 Although we found earlier that 
the  average  offer  wA  is  significantly  higher  in  the  “staff”  treatment  than  in  the  “temp” 
treatment, Figure 5(a) illustrates that player A does not earn more in the “staff” treatment than 
in the “temp” condition.
19 Thus, the premium is transferred to player r. In particular, as one 
can see in Figure 5(b), the earnings for both player a and player r are higher in the “staff” 
treatment.  Again,  a  non-parametric  test  confirms  this  result.
20  Thus,  one  could  say  that 
temporary employees receive a premium payment in the “staff” treatment in order to satisfy 
their horizontal  fairness concerns. To the contrary, employees suffer a significantly  lower 
income  in  the  “temp”  treatment  than  in  the  “staff”  treatment.
21  Average  earnings  are 
significantly lower if temporary agents decide first about their wage offer; they are higher if 
the decision of the employees comes first.    
 
Figure 5: Average earnings of  (a) of players P and A and (b) of players a and r 
 per period throughout the experiment  
 
Evidently,  these  results  confirm  H5.  Proposers  adapt  their  offers  to  the  different 
fairness foci. Moreover, one could indeed speak of some kind of first responder advantage 
due to horizontal fairness concerns, e.g., self-regarding social comparison needs. The data 
show  that  proposers  try  to  maintain  stable  ratios  between  offers  across  treatments.  Thus, 
                                                 
18 A one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the hypothesis of equal efficiency on an a = 0.05 level. 
19 A two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test confirms this claim since it cannot reject the hypothesis of equal 
efficiency on an a = 0.05 level. 
20 A one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the hypothesis of equal efficiency on an a = 0.05 level. 
21 As earlier, a one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test rejects the hypothesis of equal efficiency on an a = 0.05 
level.   21 
responders receive a premium if their focus is on the decisions of other responders with higher 
outside options. However, those responders who focus on decisions of other responders with 
lower outside options suffer a loss in their incomes since they accept lower wage offers due to 




Apparently,  fairness  concerns  matter  for  economics.  And  they  have  indeed  been  studied 
extensively  by  economists over the  last decades. However, the overwhelming  majority of 
those studies have focussed exclusively on the issue of vertical fairness considerations. Yet, 
social comparison and the resulting horizontal fairness concerns are important in most areas 
of our lives. Our experimental results demonstrate the combined relevance of vertical and 
horizontal fairness foci in interrelated ultimatum games. However, the sequential order of 
decisions  and  bargaining  steps,  which  determines  the  available  information  for  horizontal 
comparison,  is  crucial  for  determining  the  relevance  of  horizontal  fairness  concerns. 
Therefore, there are effects that favour the payoffs of the second responder, but also effects 
that decrease the payoffs of second responders.  
 
If the worker with lower outside options bargains on the smaller pie, i.e., if temporary 
employee  r  and  agency  A  bargain,  and  workers  with  higher  outside  option  observe  the 
outcome  of  the  bargaining,  i.e.,  employee  a,  the  effect  of  this  sequential  order  is 
disadvantageous  for  both  workers.  Those  players  who  have  lower  outside  options  accept 
offers due to vertical fairness concerns. Yet, players with higher outside options accept wages 
due to their horizontal comparison. By contrast, if workers with higher outside options choose 
first,  the  opposite  occurs  for  both  workers.  Yet  it  harms  proposers,  i.e.,  player  P.  Here, 
responders with lower outside options ask for higher wage offers based on their horizontal 
fairness concerns. 
 
As we could show in this experiment, behaviour is influenced in important ways by 
horizontal fairness norms. In particular, in our study we focussed on the interplay between 
vertical and horizontal fairness considerations related to wage decisions. The high relevance 
of combined vertical and horizontal fairness foci for labour economics is obvious. Since the 
topic  of  temporary  agency  work,  and,  therefore,  commonly,  heterogeneous  versus 
homogenous payment for similar work, is at the centre of extensive political discussion in the   22 
European Union, the significance of effects of multiple fairness foci is increasing rather than 
disappearing.  Yet,  the  co-employment  of  permanent  and  temporary  workers  is  only  one 
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Appendix A – Translation of the instructions for “temporary” treatment
22 
 
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment. Please refrain from talking to or 
communicating with other participants in any way during the experiment. Please note that we 
have  to  exclude  you  from  further  participation  if  you  break  this  rule.  If  you  have  any 
questions, please raise your hand. One of the experimentators will then privately answer your 
questions. Please read these instructions very carefully. 
In this experiment, you will make decisions by which you can earn money. How much you 
will  earn  depends  on  your  decisions  and  the  decisions  of  other  participants.  During  the 
experiment,  you  can  earn  points,  which  will  be  exchanged  for  Euros  at  the  end  of  the 
experiment. The exchange rate is 24 points for 1 Euro. Additionally, each of you will receive 
4 Euro independent of the number of points you earn in the experiment. 
At the beginning of the experiment you will be assigned a role, e.g., a task, by chance. This 
role remains unchanged for the complete duration of the experiment. In total, you will interact 
with  the  other  participants  for  15  rounds.  In  each  round,  three  other  participants  will  be 
anonymously assigned to your group by chance.  
The roles of the four different types of participants are labeled firm, agency, employee and 
temporary  worker.  The  firm  can  produce  products  with  her  employee  and/or  with  the 
temporary worker and gain profits. The agency can hire the temporary worker and hire him 
out to the firm or other firms. Specifically, each participant has the following tasks: 
·  The firm has to offer to the agency the fee wA to hire the temporary worker. Additionally, 
it has to make an offer wa to the employee. 
·  The agency has to accept or reject the firm’s fee offer wA. Additionally, it has to make an 
offer wr to the temporary worker. The agency can cancel temporary contracts with the firm 
if it has not succeeded in contracting with the temporary worker. 
·  The employee has to accept or reject the firm’s offer wa.  
·  The temporary worker has to accept or reject the agency’s wage offer wr.  
 
The payoffs of the participants are calculated as follows: 
·  If the employee accepts wage offer wa, he earns wa points; otherwise he earns 3 points 
from other sources. 
                                                 
22 This is a translation of the original German instructions. Changes in the “staff” treatment are indicated by 
footnotes.   25 
·  If both the agency and the temporary worker accept their offers wA and wr, the agency 
earns wA -wr points. If the temporary worker accepts his offer wr, but the agency rejects the 
firm’s offer wA, the agency places the temporary worker with some other project and gets 
10 points as a fee. The agency then receives a payoff of 10 – wr points. If the temporary 
worker rejects the agency’s wage offer wr, the agency earns nothing. 
·  If  the  temporary  worker  accepts  the  agency’s  wage  offer  wr,  he  earns  wr  points 
(regardless of whether the agency accepts the firm’s offer wA or not). If the temporary 
worker rejects the agency’s wage offer wr, he receives 1 point from other sources. 
·  If the agency, the temporary worker and the employee accept their offers wA, wr and wa, 
the firm can produce two units of products, and it thereby earns a revenue of 38 points. Its 
payoff is then 38 – wA – wa. If the employee rejects the firm’s offer, but the temporary 
worker and the agency accept their respective offers, the firm can produce one product 
unit, and it thereby earns revenues of 19 points. Its payoff is then 19 – wA. If the agency or 
the temporary worker or both reject their respective offers, but the employee accepts the 
firm’s offer, the firm produces one product unit and earns revenues of 19 points. Its payoff 
is then 19 – wa points. If the employee and the agency or the temporary worker, or both, 
reject their offers, the firm cannot produce any product units, and it earns no revenue. Its 
payoff is then 0 points. 
 
All offers have to be made in whole numbers. At the beginning of each period, the firm has to 
decide about its offers, wA and wa, to the agency and to the employee, respectively. Then the 
agency is informed about these offers; it has to accept or reject wA and decide about its wage 
offer wr. In the next step, we inform the temporary worker about the agency’s offer wr, the 
firm’s offer wA to the agency and the agency’s decision about wA. The temporary worker 
then has to accept or reject the offer wr. Then, the employee is informed about the firm’s 
wage offer wa and about the offers and decisions of the agency and the temporary worker. On 
this basis, he has to accept or reject the offer wa.
23 Finally, the firm and the agency receive the 
information on whether their offers have been accepted or not.  
 
Please note that players may realise losses if they place disadvantageous offers. This could, 
for example, occur if the sum of the firm’s offers to the agency and the employee exceeds the 
                                                 
23 The last four sentences are changed in the “staff“ treatment as follows:  
“In the next step, we inform the employee about the firm’s wage offer wa, and the employee then has to accept or 
reject the offer wa. Then the temporary worker is informed about wr and the firm’s offer wA to the agency and the 
agency’s decision about wA. On this basis, he has to accept or reject the offer wr.”   26 
revenue  from production of 38 points. Such  losses  in single periods will  be  balanced  by 
profits in other periods. However, if you accumulate a negative pay-off after 15 rounds, we 
will ask you to pay your debts by working as a research assistant at our institute (96 points = 
1 working hour). If you do not agree to this condition, please leave the experiment now. 
Before starting the experiment, we would like you to answer a short questionnaire privately. 
After 10 minutes, we will publicly present the correct solutions to all participants.   27 
Appendix B – Translation of the questionnaire 
 
(1) Let us assume the following offers are made and accepted by the respective participants:  
Hiring offer to the agency = 18 
Offer to the employee = 12  
Offer to the temporary worker = 15. 
 
How many points does the firm earn? 
(  ) 38    (  ) 38-18-12-15  (  ) 38-18-12    (  ) 38-12-15 
How many points does the agency earn? 
(  ) 36    (  ) 18      (  ) 36-15    (  ) 18-15 
How many points does the employee earn? 
(  ) 12    (  ) 15      (  ) 38-12    (  ) 15-12 
How many points does the temporary worker earn? 
(  ) 12    (  ) 15      (  ) 38-12    (  ) 15-12 
 
 
(2) Let us assume in the situation described in question (1) that the agency rejects the fee offer 
of 18, but the temporary worker accepts the offer 15. 
 
How many points does the firm earn? 
(  ) 19-15  (  ) 38-10-12-15  (  ) 19-12    (  ) 0 
How many points does the agency earn? 
(  ) 18    (  ) 18-15    (  ) 10-15 (the agency incurs a loss)  (  ) 0 
How many points does the temporary worker earn? 
(  ) 15    (  ) 10-15 (the temporary worker incurs a loss)  (  ) 19-15  (  ) 10 
 
 
(3) Let us assume in the situation described in question (1) that the agency accepts the fee 
offer of 18, but the temporary worker rejects the offer of 15. 
 
How many points does the firm earn? 
(  ) 38-10-12  (  ) 19-12    (  ) 38-12-15    (  ) 0 
How many points does the agency earn? 
(  ) 18    (  ) 18-15    (  ) 10-15 (the agency incurs a loss)  (  ) 0 
How many points does the temporary worker earn? 
(  ) 15    (  ) 1      (  ) 10-15 (the temporary worker incurs a loss)  (  ) 0 